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Strategy, Identity or Legitimacy?




Why do individuals become dual citizens by acquiring kin-state citizenship? This article
examines the case of Moldova as an extreme case of kin-state dual citizenship acquisition. In
Moldova, a majority of residents can acquire (or reacquire) Romanian citizenship by virtue of
being descended from former Romania citizens. First, the article moves beyond institutional
and migration-centred perspectives on dual citizenship acquisition. Instead, the article explores
kin-state citizenship as a practice of citizenship acquisition. The article uses 55 interviews with
ordinary people, conducted in Moldova between 2012 and 2013, to examine why individuals
choose (or not) to acquire kin-state citizenship. Second, the article argues for understanding
explanations of acquisition of kin-state citizenship beyond strategic vs identity explanations.
Rather, the article considers a third dimension of legitimacy. This legitimacy dimension demon-
strates how acquisition of kin-state citizenship is constructed as natural, normal and, thus,
legitimate. The article finds that the legitimate dimension is used even by those who do not
identify co-ethnically or with the kin-state. Ties of legitimacy can, therefore, bind individuals
to the kin-state via citizenship, irrespective of whether they identify with the kin-state.
Keywords: citizenship, Romania, Moldova, restitution, bottom-up, dual citizenship, kin-
state
Introduction
Why do individuals become dual citizens by acquiring citizenship from states that claim them as
co-ethnic (kin-states)? The existing literature focuses on empirical questions of how and why states
have (or not) opened up possibilities to migrants to acquire dual citizenship in state of residence
(Howard, 2005; Sejersen, 2008), of how and why kin-states have opened up opportunities for kin
communities to acquire kin-state citizenship while residing externally (Kova´cs, 2006; Pogonyi, 2011;
Waterbury, 2014), and normative questions of how and why migrants should have the rights to dual
citizenship (Spiro, 2010). These state-centred and normative approaches overlook why and how
individuals engage with dual citizenship provided by kin-states, (Harpaz, 2015). In other words,
scholars have typically overlooked the practice of dual citizenship acquisition.
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Among those who do examine the practice of dual citizenship, and motivations to acquire dual
citizenship from kin-states, scholars emphasise either identity (Vasiljevic´, 2014), or strategic factors
(Heintz, 2008; Harpaz, 2015). For example, in the case of acquisition of Romanian citizenship in
Moldova, and the case of this article, Heintz (2008) downplays the role of identity. She argues
that individuals do not acquire Romanian citizenship because they identify as Romanian or with
Romania, but because of strategic reasons, such as access to EU travel and work rights. By contrast
Vasiljevic´ (2014), examining the acquisition of dual citizenship from kin-states in the post-Yugoslav
context, emphasises citizenship as something symbolic and an ‘identity-forming’ experience.
In sum, there is disagreement about the role of strategic versus identity factors in explaining
why individuals seek dual citizenship from kin-state. First, this debate overlooks how strategic and
identity explanations might work in tandem. For example, the strategic value of kin-state dual
citizenship might be more significant to those who already identify with the kin-state. Second, this
strategic-identity debate overlooks other dimensions which might explain acquisition. In particular,
it overlooks how dual citizenship might be considered normal, natural and rightful for external kin
communities. In this article, I frame this third dimension as a legitimate dimension.
To examine these dimensions—strategic, identity and legitimate—and the interaction between
the dimensions, this article focuses on the reacquisition of Romanian citizenship by those residing in
Moldova. First, this case o↵ers theoretical leverage because the majority of Moldovan citizens are
eligible for Romanian citizenship. Reacquiring Romanian citizenship is also popular in Moldova.
Second, most individuals who reacquire Romanian citizenship do so within Moldova (Harpaz, 2015).
Third, Moldova provides a useful context to address the concept of strategic citizenship because
Moldovan citizenship provides few global opportunities. Meanwhile, Romanian citizenship provides
greater global access and opportunities, notably within the EU. Romanian citizenship. Thus,
Romanian citizenship has a high instrumental value for Moldovans.
Overall, the article does not find strategic explanations to be most significant. Rather, the
article argues that the popularity of Romanian citizenship is explained by how it is framed as
something as ‘natural’ and ‘normal’ in Moldova, and thus legitimate. This legitimate dimension is
significant for explaining how individuals might frame Romanian citizenship in Moldova as a right to
be recovered, irrespective of the strategic value or identity-bearing role of Romanian citizenship. In
other words, Romanian citizenship was conceived as a normal right for those in Moldova regardless
of whether individuals identified with Romania, as a kin-state, or as Romanian.
From Singular to Dual Citizenship
Citizenship binds together individuals and the state. It is a vital democratic (and democratiz-
ing) institution, providing access to political and social rights and formalizing the basis on which
individuals have reciprocal obligations to the state (Isin and Turner, 2007: 16; Marshall, 1950,
1998; Turner, 1997). Until the late twentieth century, citizenship was conceived as a singular rela-
tion between individuals and the state. The Hague Convention (1930) established an international
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principle of ‘one nationality only’. Dual citizenship was pathologised as a form of ‘bigamy’. Dual
citizens conceived as potential sources of subversion, particularly within the spectre of the Cold
War (Spiro, 1997).
More recently, with increasing migration flows and a shift towards more inclusive norms, states
have desecuritised and opened up opportunities dual citizenship (Harpaz and Mateos, Forthcoming).
Individuals with dual and/or multiple citizenship ties are no longer a threat to the state (Pogonyi,
2011; Spiro, 2010). As empirical studies show, the road to the expansion of dual citizenship
has been slow. Migrant-sending states such as Turkey (see Kaya, 2012), realized dual citizenship
was necessary to allow emigrants to keep home-state citizenship rather than forcing emigrants to
renounce citizenship (Benhabib et al., 2007: 1; Benhabib, 2005: 1; see also Kastoryano, 2005).
Migrant-receiving states slowly allowed long-term immigrants to naturalize. At the same time,
many states continue to restrict dual citizenship. These include states: with large diaspora (e.g.
China, see (Yen-Fen and Wu, 2011; Low, 2016)), contentious relations with nearby states (e.g. India
vis-a`-vis Pakistan, see (Dickinson and Bailey, 2007)) and large minority populations (e.g. Slovakia,
Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, (Shevel, 2009)). In the case of India, dual citizenship is permitted
for global diaspora but not for individuals residing in Pakistan and Bangladesh, among others
(Dickinson and Bailey, 2007; Harpaz and Mateos, Forthcoming). Moldova, the focus of this paper,
has permitted dual citizenship since 2002.
Dual Citizenship as a Kin-State Policy
This expansion, and growing acceptance, of dual citizenship is theorised as evidence of cosmopoli-
tanism. For example, through dual citizenship, states are becoming more inclusive and accepting
of diverse multicultural societies. In turn, membership rights have become multiplied and fluid,
leading to citizenship constellations across state borders (Stasiulis and Ross, 2006; Baubo¨ck, 2010),
and a post-national norm of citizenship (Soysal, 1994; Tambini, 2001). This expansion of dual citi-
zenship for immigrants and emigrants is associated with regional flows of immigration, for example
to the ‘old’ EU member-states and North America (Howard, 2005).
Questions of dual citizenship outside of western Europe concern more the expansion of citizen-
ship to external co-ethnic kin, whether in east and south east Asia (Brubaker and Kim, 2011; Ong,
1999), Latin America (Tintori, 2011), or central and eastern Europe (Neofotistos, 2009; Vasiljevic´,
2014; Waterbury, 2014; Dzankic, 2012). As Kova´cs (2006: 433) argues, questions of dual citi-
zenship in central and eastern Europe ‘touch upon sensitive issues of state sovereignty and evoke
problems of historically disputed borders and trans-border ethnic-kin minorities’, by demonstrating
the enduring tensions of who belongs to these states.
With the growing acceptance of dual citizenship, kin-states in Central and Eastern Europe have
adopted these policies without adopting the same ‘transnational, post-national or cosmopolitan’
norms of inclusion (Pogonyi, 2011: 685). Rather, kin-states use dual citizenship as a policy of
extra-territorial nation-building by expanding the citizenry to non-resident individuals the kin-
3
Eleanor Knott
state considers to be co-ethnic. Domestically, kin-states use dual citizenship to pursue populist
policies of nation-building, as an electioneering strategy, to generate financial resources from wealthy
external co-ethnic communities (e.g. in China). Externally, kin-states use dual citizenship policies
to increase their influence in neighbouring states (Isin and Turner, 2007; Waterbury, 2014; Pogonyi,
2011). Dual citizenship, in the case of kin-states, is far from the post-national cosmopolitan ideal.
Instead, kin-states are actively conducting ‘post-territorial’ nation-building strategies to maintain
relations with, and increase influence over, with kin communities by extending citizenship to these
communities (Ragazzi and Balalovska: 2).
At the same time, kin-states adopt framing strategies which obscure these nation-building aims.
For example, separate to naturalisation policies for resident immigrants, Romania o↵ers the right
of citizenship reacquisition (redobaˆndire). Eligibility is for those who reside in territories that were
annexed from Greater Romanian to the Soviet Union in 1941 and can prove descendancy, up to the
third generation, to interwar (1918-1941) Romanian citizens (Iordachi, 2010). Romania justifies
this policy on the basis that these former citizens unwillingly lost Romanian citizenship when these
territories were annexed by the Soviet Union. As Romania’s former president (2004-2014) Traian
Ba˘sescu argued: it was not Moldovans’ fault they ‘lost’ their Romanian citizenship; rather it was
‘Stalin who has decided’ for them (EurActiv, 2010). Romania does not o↵er a policy of natu-
ralization ‘en masse’ (Iordachi, 2004). Individuals must apply themselves to reacquire Romanian
citizenship, but do not have to prove Romanian ethnic/cultural identification or linguistic ability.
As a result, Romania argues these rights to reacquire Romanian citizenship are not ethnically but
territorially defined. Explicitly, then, Romania’s policy is territorial. The policy’s restorationist
tone implies a more ethnicized undertone of Romanian citizenship (Waterbury, 2014: 37), even if
Romania does its best to de-ethnicize the image of citizenship reacquisition.
Kin-State Dual Citizenship from the Bottom-Up
Analysis of kin-state dual citizenship is predominantly state-centred, top-down and institutional.
Thus, such analysis focuses on the supply-side and legal basis of dual citizenship, and the impact of
dual citizenship policies (Ronkainen, 2011). Less explored are the ‘contexts, meanings and practices
that make citizenship possible’ (Nyers, 2007: 79; Isin and Turner, 2007: 16).
Citizenship practices have been analysed elsewhere, in anthropology, sociology and social psy-
chology, from the perspective of informal and ‘everyday encounters’, in particular, in terms of
debates around the relationship between multiculturalism and experiences of citizenship (Hopkins
and Blackwood, 2011: 226). Some research has also begun to open up analysis of migration-centred
dual citizenship acquisition. For example, Yanasmayan (2015: 787-788) uses a typology of thin vs
thick citizenship. Yanasmayan (2015) considers how far dual citizenship is a thin utilitarian status
‘devoid of’ or tied to emotional bonds, as opposed to a thicker and more symbolic status, which
‘implies an emotional bond’ to citizenship (see also Ronkainen, 2011).
By contrast, research on the practice of kin-state citizenship policies is relatively under-
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developed. Following migration-centred research, the debate remains between thicker identity-
based explanations of dual citizenship practices against thinner strategic explanations of kin-state
citizenship acquisition (see also Leuchter, 2014). 1 In her research on Moldova, Heintz adopts
a thin understanding of Romanian citizenship and deliberately refutes the notion that Romanian
citizenship might be a thicker identity-based status for individuals in Moldova. By contrast, in her
research of Serbian citizenship among external ethnic Serb communities across the territory of For-
mer Yugoslavia, Vasiljevic´ (2014: 3, 10) emphasises the ‘identity-forming and recognition-bearing
social role’ of citizenship.
This article o↵ers a di↵erent perspective. First, it considers how kin-state citizenship acquisition
can be both strategic and identity-based. In other words, the article argues that strategic or identity
explanations should not necessarily be conceived as mutually exclusive logics. Second, the article
argues for a third legitimate dimension, where kin-state citizenship is a rightful status for members
of the kin community to hold. This legitimate dimension can be expressed instead, or alongside a
combination, of strategic and identity explanations.
Romania’s Kin-State Citizenship Policy in Moldova
Moldova and Romania have a special relationship. Historically, Moldova was part of interwar
Romania, and a part of the ancient principality of Moldova remains in Romania. Ethnically and
culturally, there is a similarity (though controversy) between what it means to be Moldovan and Ro-
manian. Moldovan censuses enumerate the ethnic categories of Romanian and Moldova separately,
while Romania considers the categories to be coterminous. In other words, Romania considers
Moldovans to be Romanians (Department for Romanians Abroad). Linguistically, the languages
of Romanian and Moldovan are the same.2 In previous research, I develop categories which prob-
lematize this all or nothing approach. Rather, I argue that there are di↵erent ways of identifying
as Romanian and/or Moldovan, which demonstrate the nuances, contestation and even uncertainty
of the question— “who are we? (cine suntem noi)?”—in Moldova (Knott, 2015a; Knott, 2015b).
I discuss these categories below, as well as how I use these categories to structure the analysis of
citizenship explanations.
As Harpaz (2015: 2091) shows, 97% of those becoming non-resident Romanian do so while resid-
1The small amount of literature considering (re)acquisition of Romanian citizenship in Moldova makes the same
argument, in terms of a strategic vs symbolic framing, and commonly emphasizes the strategic as opposed to the
symbolic rationale of citizenship Heintz, M. (2008) State and Citizenship in Moldova: a Pragmatic Point of View.
In: Heintz M (ed) Weak state, Uncertain citizenship: Moldova. Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1-18, Suveica, S.
(2013) ’Entering the EU through the Back Door’?! Debates on Romanian Citizenship for Moldovans. Eurolimes, 16:
272–284.
2In Moldova’s 2014 census, 54.6% recorded Moldovan and 24% recorded Romanian (i.e. 78.4%) as the language
most commonly spoken identified Moldova, N. B. o. S. o. t. R. o. (2014) Caracteristici - Populat, ie 1, Rezultatele
Recensa˘mıˆntului Populat, iei s, i al Locuint,elor 2014 (Characteristics - Population 1, Population and Housing Census in
the Republic of Moldova, May 12-25, 2014). Linguistically, Romanian and Moldovan languages are interchangeable
and mutually intelligible; the choice of name is more political Ciscel, M. H. (2006) A Separate Moldovan Language?
The Sociolinguistics of Moldova’s Limba de Stat. Nationalities Papers, 34: 575-597.). More detail is o↵ered below
concerning dates over language and ethnic identification in Moldova, in particular, how these are categorised.
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ing in Moldova, in comparison to just 0.7% from Ukraine and 1% from Israel. As such, Moldova is a
critical case of non-resident citizenship reacquisition. It is useful to know more about why so many
might seek Romanian citizenship, while neither residing nor planning to reside in Romania. Reac-
quiring Romanian citizenship in Moldova has been popular since Moldovan independence in 1991.
While Romanian citizenship is predominantly uncontroversial today, holding dual and multiple
citizenship was not permitted in Moldova until 2002 (Gasca, 2010; Monitorul Oficial al Republicii
Moldova, 2002). Even then, the Communist government, in o ce 2001-2009, continued to prevent
holders of dual citizenship from holding public o ce. Two figures in the opposition, Alexandru
Ta˘nase (constitutional court judge and oppositional politician) and Dorin Chirtoaca˘ (Mayor of
Chis, ina˘u, 2007-present), brought a case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The
ECtHR ruled in 2010 that it was restrictive on democracy to prevent dual citizens from holding
o ce and Moldova was forced to revoke this policy (ECtHR, 2010). At the same time, Moldova
experienced a pro-European political transition with the Communist government losing o ce in
2009. The interim president, Mihai Ghimpu (incidentally Chirtoaca˘’s uncle), swiftly repealed re-
strictions on dual citizens holding public o ce, even before the ECtHR ruling. This signalled an
increasingly political permissiveness to dual citizenship, and specifically towards holding Romanian
citizenship, in Moldova.
Romania’s policy of towards kin-state citizenship has received criticism from EU agencies
(though not the EU Commission) and western European right-wing media because Romania is
perceived to be facilitating policies that might lead to mass migration of Moldovans to EU member-
states (Knott, 2017). Reacquiring Romanian citizenship has been a popular policy, although it
remains unclear by how much. Romania has been (seemingly) unwilling to be transparent about
how many have reacquired Romanian citizenship in Moldova, in particular, since 2009. For exam-
ple, Romania has not declared its statistics of citizenship acquisition and reacquisition to Eurostat
since then.3 Before 2009, Romanian statistics submitted to Eurostat indicate that (only) 11,993
Moldovans reacquired Romanian citizenship between 1998 and 2009 (Eurostat, 1998-2012). A Soros
Romania report indicates reports a higher number, where 226,507 cases were ‘solved’ between 1991
and 2011 (Panainte and Nedelciuc, 2012). Records from Cetatenie.ro report similarly large numbers
of ordin, records of those called to file their documents for citizenship reacquisition (Figure 1).
Romanian citizenship has a high potential value for Moldovan citizens. It opens up rights to
legally travel and work abroad, especially in the UK, that Moldovan citizenship could not o↵er
(Figure 2). Before EU visa liberalisation for Moldovan citizens in April 2014, the visa-free travel
rights provided by Moldovan citizenship were minimal. For example, Romania’s accession to the
EU in 2007 required Moldovan citizens to apply for a Romanian visa; previously, Moldovan citizens
had been able to travel to Romania without a passport. At the same time, following accession,
Romanian citizenship granted access to EU citizenship, and the equal and commensurate rights
and benefits of this status. As Waterbury (2009: 156) argues, applications for reacquisition ‘rose
3Personal correspondence with Romania’s National Citizenship Authority (Autorita˘t¸ii Nat¸ionale pentru Ceta˘t¸enie,
ANC) revealed that the agency does not collect citizenship acquisition and reacquisition data by country of origin,
even though Romania is required by Eurostat to do so.
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Figure 1: 1 Number of Applications Processed by ANC (Article 11, 2005-2014)
Note: no data is available on whether these were positively or negatively processed, i.e. whether
applicants were accepted or denied citizenship; Source: www.cetatenie.ro
dramatically’ in line with Romania’s ever-successful track towards EU accession, where Romanian
citizenship became an ‘instrumental’ way ‘of improving life chances’.
Access to Romanian citizenship therefore had, and continues to have, a high strategic value in
terms of the rights and benefits that can be attained, within the EU and globally, to substitute
for the weak comparative power of Moldovan citizenship. This value is emphasised in existing
analyses of Romanian citizenship, with scholars arguing that reacquisition of Romanian citizenship
is explained just by strategic, rather than symbolic, reasons because of the opportunities o↵ered
by Romanian citizenship via its attachment to EU rights (Heintz, 2008; Suveica, 2013; Iordachi,
2004; Waterbury, 2009). This existing research is based on assumptions about the strategic value
of Romanian citizenship in Moldova and lacks examination of the practice of Romanian citizenship
reacquisition from the bottom-up.
Methodology: Studying Dual Citizenship from the Bottom-Up
By examining the practice of Romanian citizenship reacquisition, this article analyses the ‘lay’
categories of ‘everyday social experience’ to ask how and why individuals engage with Romanian
citizenship in Moldova (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 4). It focuses on the everyday ‘categories of
practice’ as opposed to top-down ‘categories of analysis’ to understand how people ‘enact (and ig-
nore and deflect)’ and give meaning to citizenship practices ‘in the varied contexts of their everyday
lives’ (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 537; Brubaker et al., 2006).
Following the practice-oriented approach, I focused on collecting ‘experience-near’/emic under-
standings of identities, institutions and concepts rather than top-down or experience-far concepts
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Figure 2: Visa Restriction Index (Rank)
Source: Henley Partners 2016, visaindex.com; NB: the lower the rank, the more powerful the
passport in terms of visa-free access to other states
(Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012; Geertz, 1975). I was interested both in how participants identi-
fied, the meanings they ascribed to these forms of identification, and how participants engaged with
(or not) Romanian citizenship reacquisition as a practice. This included participants’ experiences
of these practices and the reasoning participants gave for their engagement or lack of engagement.
To some extent, this article is limited by the fact that it relies on individuals self-reporting their ex-
planations, and being able to articulate these explanations. At the same time, this article is based
on the stories people tell about the meanings of identification and citizenship practices. These
stories, meanings and practices, as discussed above, are a vital dimension of understanding citizen-
ship as something more than a political/legal institution, but as something that is experienced in
consequential ways at the level of the everyday.
In terms of data, I conducted 55 semi-structured interviews between 2012 and 2013 in Chis, ina˘u,
the capital of Moldova, in Romanian and English (see Appendix). About two thirds of participants
were male (n=38); one third were female (n=17). Most participants were in their 20s (n=36) or 30s
(n=11), with a few in their 40s (n=6) or 50s (n=2). In selecting participants, as a small-n sample,
I was not aiming for a representative sample or to make claims of representativeness (Small, 2009).
Instead, I aim for an in-depth study which examines a broad range of participants, for example,
across the political spectrum, by seeking participants from across the youth wings of Moldova’s
political parties, to explore ‘multiple perspectives’ and ‘contradictory narratives’ (Schwartz-Shea
and Yanow, 2012: 51). As a small-n study, the article is also restricted in considering primarily
Moldova’s post-Soviet generation. Practically, these participants were easier to contact, either via
organisational networks or through existing participants, and to build rapport with. Theoretically
too, these participants are interesting for experiencing similar socialization, vis-a`-vis each other, in
contrast to the Soviet generation (i.e. participants’ parents).
Critically, I analyse only participants who identified as Romanian and/or Moldovan. Those who
identify as ethnically Ukrainian or Russia, could also be eligible for Romanian citizenship if they
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could prove descendancy (up to the third generation) from citizens of interwar Greater Romania.
These individuals, however, fall outside this paper because I am concerned only with individuals
that Romania consider to be co-ethnic. At the same time, I do not conceive that individuals do
or should necessarily identify with the mutually exclusive ethnic census categories of Romanian or
Moldovan. Rather, in line the bottom-up approach described above, this article is interested in
what it means to be Romanian and/or Moldovan, and how these di↵erent meanings intersect with
citizenship practices.
Romanian Citizenship Practices in Moldova
The rest of this article unpacks di↵erent explanations underpinning participants’ engagement with
Romanian citizenship reacquisition (redobaˆndire). It focuses on three dimensions: strategic, sym-
bolic and legitimate explanations.
By strategic explanation, I mean a framing of Romanian citizenship that focuses on maximising
its instrumental/material benefits and opportunities. This explanation emphasises the value of the
status for individuals and their relatives (Stasiulis and Ross, 2006; Balta and Altan-Olcay, 2015).
Here, for example, individuals might discuss access to EU rights that would confer a superior set
of rights than could be accessed from Romanian citizenship (Harpaz, 2015).
By identity explanation, I mean a framing of Romanian citizenship that focuses on the identity-
component of Romanian citizenship. For example, individuals might link citizenship to identifying
as Romanian or a sense of belonging to Romania. This ‘thicker’ notion of citizenship emphasizes
the emotional bonds and ‘social role’ of citizenship (Yanasmayan, 2015; Vasiljevic´, 2014; Leuchter,
2014). Here, citizenship is a status of belonging with an important identity-component that should
be unpacked.
By legitimate explanation, I mean a framing Romanian citizenship that emphasises the rightful,
normalness and naturalness of dimension of Romanian citizenship. These explanations rest on the
idea that it is Moldovans’ right to hold Romanian citizenship. This legitimate dimension is separate
to the strategic explanation because it is not tied to what can be gained, or maximised, instrumen-
tally from citizenship acquisition. Similarly, the legitimate dimension is separate to the identity
explanation because it does not concern identity, emotional bonds or belonging to Romania as a
cultural or political entity. Specifically, individuals do not necessarily seek Romanian citizenship
because they identify as Romanian or want this identification recognised by the Romanian state.
Rather, the legitimate dimension emphasises how a status is attached to a set of rights. In turn,
this is bu↵ered by a sense of past injustice, in particular, that experienced directly by identifiable
relatives.
The central contribution of this article is to explore this legitimate dimension, where Roma-
nian citizenship is framed as normal and natural, and as a right for Moldovans, as opposed to
something reacquired for its material strategic or identity components. The article also explores
the combination of these explanations where the strategic, identity and legitimate explanations are
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not necessarily mutually exclusive explanations. Rather, these are interlocking and intersecting
explanations.
Analytically, I first break down the participants into five inductively derived conceptual cat-
egories. These categories are formed out of areas of identification agreement (within categories)
and disagreement (across categories) in terms of how participants identified as Romanian and/or
Moldovan, how they identified as Romanian and/or Moldovan and how they positioned themselves
vis-a`-vis Romania and Moldova:
1. Organic Romanians (n=22) had the strongest and organic identification as ethnically
Romanian
2. Cultural Romanians (n=15) identified ethnically as Romanian, but qualified this by identi-
fying Moldova as their home
3. Ambivalent Romanians (n=5) identified as partially but not wholly both Romanian and
somewhat Moldovan
4. Moldovans (n=10) identified primarily as Moldovan but explained this in terms of being a
citizen of Moldova
5. Linguistic Moldovans (n=3) identified primarily as Moldovan on the basis that they were
culturally and linguistically Moldovan and distinct from those who were Romanian.
I use these categories to unpack the potential association between identification, explanations for
engaging with Romanian citizenship and explanations for this engagement (or lack of). These cate-
gories also work across the mutually exclusive census categories of ethnic Romanian and Moldovan,
to indicate the uncertain rather than hard boundary between the two forms of identification. This
also means that I conceive of Romanian more broadly than the Moldovan census, which cate-
gorises ethnic Romanians as a minority. Rather I focus on participants’ meanings of Romanian and
Moldovan identification.
This article does not propose and test a formal hypothesis. Rather, it examines the assumption
that there might be an association between the strength of meanings and practices. For this
assumption to be borne out by the evidence, we would observe that those identifying more with
Romania and as Romanian (Organic Romanians and Cultural Romanians) would engage, and
engage more vociferously, with Romanian citizenship compared to those who identified less as
Romanian and with Romania (Linguistic Moldovans and Moldovans).
In fact, the article finds di↵erently: engagement with Romanian citizenship is not associated
with the strength of identification as Romanian and with Romania. However, the strength of
identification is associated with specific explanations. As might be expected, those identifying more
vociferously as Romanian and with Romania imbued the reacquisition of Romanian citizenship more
symbolically and explained identity to be more significant than those identify less as Romanian and
with Romania. Across the identification categories, the article shows that the third dimension of
legitimacy is significant where Romanian citizenship was framed as a legitimate right. This helps
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to explain the prevalence of Romanian citizenship, because it is constructed as ‘normal’, ‘natural’
and, thus, legitimate.
Organic Romanians
Organic Romanians identified most strongly as Romanian and framed this identification organically,
as something essential and biological. For example, Organic Romanians reasoned that they shared
not only the ‘same language’ as Romanians (in Romania) but also the ‘same blood’. Most Organic
Romanians had reacquired Romanian citizenship for had applied for Romanian citizenship (17/22).
Only a minority of Organic Romanians (5/22) did not want to reacquire Romanian citizenship
because they ‘already consider[ed]’ themselves Romanian and saw no reason to ‘change’ this with
Romanian citizenship [MD-47, MD-42]. This already-existing identity was bu↵ered either by the
rationale that applying was too di cult and costly, particularly for the older participants [MD-
47, MD-48, MD-42]. Romanian citizenship also seemed unnecessary because they were willing to
‘wait for [EU] visa liberalization’ which the Moldovan administration had ‘promised’ would happen
in 2014 [MD-47, MD-48].4 More sentimentally, two participants objected to having to apply for
Romanian citizenship reacquisition because they considered Romanian citizenship a ‘natural right’
that should be conferred automatically [MD-14, MD-8].
By contrast with this minority, most Organic Romanians opted to reacquire Romanian citi-
zenship. In justifying this preference, Organic Romanians set themselves apart from what they
perceived as the pure instrumentality of those who sought Romanian citizenship ‘not [as] a way to
feel Romanian’ but as a ‘formula to go abroad legally’ [MD-42, MD-47, MD-28]. Hence, they framed
these ‘profiteers’ as illegitimate seekers of Romanian citizenship because these profiteers were ‘true
Russian, like speaking native Russian’ [MD-42, MD-18, MD-49]. Even though technically, Roma-
nian citizenship was reacquired territorially, Organic Romanians conceived of reacquiring Romanian
citizenship as an ethnic right that required evidence of a genuine linguistic, cultural and/or ethnic
link to Romania.
For Organic Romanians, strategic motivations were still personally significant. As MD-46 de-
scribed, it would be ‘a little disingenuous’ to deny that the strategic gains of Romanian citizenship
played ‘a bit’ of a role in motivating them to reacquire Romanian citizenship [MD-46]. These strate-
gic motivations were complex, concerning not only issues of EU travel and work rights [MD-35,
MD-39, MD-11, MD-16, MD-32], but also issues of security. Romanian citizenship functioned as
a form of personal ‘insurance’ against future instability [MD-32] and geopolitically, as a ‘balance,
so to speak, in the area’ in the case of an eventuality such as if Russia were to ‘strike’ Moldova
[MD-46].
Identity motivations were also more important for Organic Romanians than other categories,
reflecting their organic identification as Romanian and with Romania. Organic Romanians framed
their reacquisition of Romanian citizenship as ‘natural’ [MD-35, MD-18, MD-28, MD-25a, MD-25b,
4This sentiment would prove correct with EU visa liberalisation introduced in April 2014.
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MD-10, MD-15, MD-39]. As a status, it opened up the possibility to be and become ‘Romanian
like them’ (in Romania) where they could live in Romania ‘not as [an] immigrant but as a citizen
will all rights and obligations’ [MD-32]. Lastly, in identity terms, it allowed Organic Romanians to
‘become European’ because ‘through Romanian citizenship’ they became also a ‘European citizen’
[MD-35, MD-39, MD-16, MD-39]. In terms of legitimacy, Organic Romanians framed reacquiring
Romanian citizenship as ‘my right’. They explained how their grandparents had lost their ‘natural
right’ to Romanian citizenship in a ‘very abusive way’ when Moldova was annexed by the Soviet
Union [MD-1, MD-2, MD-28, MD-25a, MD-26a, MD-46]. This echoed o cial Romanian discourse
in describing Romanian citizenship as a process of ‘recovery’, which recognized the ‘historic truth’
by signifying they had ‘finally got their right citizenship’ [MD-11, MD-26a].
While Organic Romanians did use a strategic justification for their reacquisition of Romanian
citizenship, this was accompanied, if not superseded, by identity and legitimate dimensions. For
example, these participants saw Romanian citizenship was a source of pride [MD-16, MD-10]. Sig-
nificantly, reacquiring Romanian citizenship was not a zero-sum practice. Rather, their ‘obligations’
and support for Romania came after and did not replace, their obligations and support towards
Moldova [MD-32, MD-2, MD-14]. Instead, the zero-sum game was between closer a liation with
the EU (via Romania) or Russia, because citizenship was a ‘political tool’ used both by Roma-
nia and Russia to ‘take more influence’ in Moldova [MD-10, MD-26a]. Romanian citizenship for
Organic Romanians was, therefore, more a signifier of geopolitical allegiances, and of an identity
shift towards Romania and the EU, than political allegiances or territorial preferences. In other
words, Organic Romanians held geopolitical attachments to Romania and the EU, but this did not
translate to wanting Moldova to be politically, and territorially, absorbed into Romania.
Cultural Romanians
Cultural Romanians identified as ethnically Romanian and Moldovan citizens, and conceived of
Moldova as their home. The majority of Cultural Romanians had reacquired (8/15), were reac-
quiring (1/15) or would apply for Romanian citizenship (4/15); a minority had not applied (2/15).
Those Cultural Romanians who had not applied to reacquire Romanian citizenship indicated
either regret for not having applied [M-20] or a possible desire [MD-26b]. They felt it was ‘too
late’ to apply [MD-20] or too strategic to apply [MD-26]. These Cultural Romanians also criticized
those who were motivated primarily by the ‘benefits’ of Romanian citizenship, allowing them to go
to Italy or Spain for work [MD-26b].
Those Cultural Romanians who had or were applying for Romanian citizenship were similarly
critical of the ‘opportunism’ of others, citing those who could not speak Romanian and had to
falsely ‘create [. . . ] some sort of lineage’ to Romania to reacquire Romanian citizenship [MD-
43, MD-19, MD-12, MD-4, MD-43, MD-24]. From a personal perspective, Cultural Romanians
indicated more of a strategic justification than Organic Romanians. For these Cultural Romanians,
Romanian citizenship was a ‘necessity’ that o↵ered the ‘certainty’ and flexibility to travel beyond
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post-Soviet space [MD-44, MD-26b, MD-33, MD-9, 43, MD-19, MD-51, MD-12, MD-40]. These
‘practical reasons’ behind reacquiring Romanian citizenship were amplified by acquiring EU rights,
where reacquiring Romanian citizenship was ‘our backdoor’ to the EU [MD-40, MD-33]. As Organic
Romanians, Cultural Romanians described the complexity of this strategic justification. For them,
Romanian citizenship was a form of insurance, demonstrating their desire to seek security from
Romania ‘just in case’ the situation in Moldova deteriorated [MD-9, MD-12].
An identity justification for Romanian citizenship was less important for Cultural Romanians,
by contrast to Organic Romanians. Still, Cultural Romanians did acknowledge the significance of
Romanian citizenship. For them, Romanian citizenship was not ‘another passport’ but a ‘privilege’
they were ‘proud’ of because it granted a sense of ‘legitimacy’ in their ‘connection with Romania
that’s also certified in an o cial manner’ [MD-24, MD-23, MD-45]. Cultural Romanians also
problematized this identity justification through articulating a sense of psychological anguish and
the interpersonal conflicts which could arise from reacquiring Romanian citizenship. For example,
MD-55, whose father was a veteran of the Moldovan army in the Transnistrian conflict (1992-1993),
felt a sense of betrayal: ‘how could I consider myself a citizen of another state?’. For her, Romanian
citizenship signified the need to ‘renounce my principles, any patriotic principles I have’ because of
the material necessity of Romanian citizenship.
Finally, Cultural Romanians, as Organic Romanians underscored the legitimacy of reacquir-
ing Romanian citizenship. They framed Romanian citizenship, atonefully, as an ‘apology’ which
‘recognis[ed] our common history’ and allowed them to get back their ‘real’ citizenship which was
removed from their grandparents by the Soviet Union [MD-19, MD-45, MD-24]. Others did not feel
‘real’ Romanian citizens because they resided outside of Romania [MD-12, MD-23, MD-24]. Thus,
similar to Organic Romanians, reacquiring Romanian citizenship did not replace their identification
or a liation with Moldova. Rather, these Cultural Romanians remained ‘in love’ with Moldova but
now ‘just had two passports, one blue (Moldovan) and one red (Romanian)’ [MD-9, MD-5, MD-19,
MD-12].
Ambivalent Romanians
Ambivalent Romanians identified as partially Romanian and Moldovan, di↵erentiating themselves
from being wholly Romanian due to di↵erent political experiences from Romania, historically (in
terms of the Soviet Union) and presently (in terms of Romania being more European). Ambivalent
Romanians were split equally between those who had (3/5) and had not (2/5) reacquired Romanian
citizenship.
Those who had not reacquired Romanian citizenship recognized the ‘important advantages’ of
Romanian citizenship, by permitting access to EU rights and the ‘big European family’ [MD-3].
Rather, it was the financial and time costs of application which inhibited their desire to reacquire
Romanian citizenship, where they did not want to spend time changing family documents [MD-17].
As Cultural and Organic Romanians, Ambivalent Romanians criticized strategic motivations.
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They explained how ‘not everyone’ reacquired Romanian citizenship ‘in a normal or good way’ by
using it only to ‘work in a shitty job (in Spain or Italy) and come back here and buy a cool car’
[MD-50]. It was still a strategic and not a ‘very nationalistic’ practice [MD-50]. Here the temporal
element was noticeable: for those reacquiring in the late 2000s, the strategic benefits, of access
to EU rights such as travel, were a popular reason [MD-27, MD-50] and contrasted with those
who reacquired in the 1990s, while studying in Romania, because ‘why not’ have it [MD-6]. The
strategic opportunities for citizenship, such as access to a ‘better education’ and to ‘change’ where
you live, were also important.
Although identity discourses were absent from Ambivalent Romanians, they still framed Ro-
manian citizenship as legitimate. These participants explained how they were ‘getting back the
citizenship [. . . ] because my grandpa, grandmother had it’ [MD-27]. Thus, Romania’s policy of
‘gathering citizens’ was a ‘way of (Romania) saying we are sorry’ for having ‘evacuated’ Moldova
[MD-27]. Hence, Ambivalent Romanians normalized reacquiring Romanian citizenship. They be-
lieved that Romania was neither ‘exceptional’ in providing this right, nor were they ‘breaking any
laws’ in reacquiring Romanian citizenship [MD-27, MD-6].
As Cultural and Organic Romanians, reacquiring Romanian citizenship did not a↵ect Ambiva-
lent Romanians’ partial identification as Romanian, or with Romania [MD-6]. Instead, reacquiring
Romanian citizenship enabled a bottom-up process of ‘individual European integration’ over the
last twenty years. This was the ‘greatest outcome’ for them: to be able to travel to the EU and
‘feel for the first time that I’m a European citizen’ [MD-27].
Moldovans
Moldovans identified both culturally and politically as Moldovan. Most Moldovans had reacquired
(4/10) or were waiting to reacquire (3/10) Romanian citizenship, while a minority had not (3/10).
Those Moldovans who had not reacquired Romanian citizenship explained they did not ‘need’
Romanian citizenship [MD-52, MD-21]. As Ambivalent Romanians, they were either discouraged
by the ‘bureaucratic’ process or did not see the feel the necessary push factors to see reacquiring
Romanian citizenship as strategically useful [MD-52, MD-21]. The exception was MD-56 who had
recently decided he was now ‘forced’ to reacquire Romanian citizenship after he had a Romanian
visa application refused. He previously felt constrained by the costs, watching his wife spend ‘all
the time and money and nerve cells [...] to collect all the articles’. Because his brother would apply,
he could now share the costs (financial and time) of applying, because his brother would ‘take care
of the articles’, demonstrating the familial aspects which collectivized the decisions of individuals
in reacquiring Romanian citizenship [MD-56].
For Moldovans who had reacquired Romanian citizenship, strategic motivations dominated. Ro-
manian citizenship ‘makes life easier’ by opening ‘more possibilities’, enabling them to travel a ‘few
times a year’ to EU states and the opportunity of a ‘good education in western universities’ [MD-
34, MD-38, MD-37]. By comparison, only a minority explained identity motivations originating
14
Eleanor Knott
from the idea they had ‘Romanian ancestry’ which legitimized their right to reacquire Romanian
citizenship [MD-36, MD-34]. Unlike some Ambivalent and Cultural Romanians, Moldovans, inter-
estingly, did not discuss identity conflicts either, indicating their framing of Romanian citizenship
as a strategic practice.
While Moldovans did not describe changes to how they identified with Romania, they indicated
changes from their equalizing status vis-a`-vis the EU and Romania. Moldovans were more critical
than other categories, of the potentially negative impacts of Romanian citizenship because of their
perception that Romanian citizenship could contribute to Moldova’s depopulation by enabling
those with Romanian citizenship to work abroad [MD-36]. Other Moldovans resisted this discourse
believing that ‘most’ who wanted to leave ‘they already did that’, without reacquiring Romanian
citizenship though not legally [MD-34].
Although they did not frame Romanian citizenship as a form of security, Moldovans discussed
it as a proxy of weak state capacity. For Moldovans, the popularity of Romanian citizenship was
an ‘indicator of lack of performance’ and belief in Moldova’s ‘commitments’ to its citizens [MD-21,
MD-56]. Here Moldovans, unlike previous categories, pathologised elite practices of Romanian cit-
izenship believing this signified a lack of belief ‘in the future of the country they rule’ by accessing
something that could allow them to invest outside of Moldova [MD-56]. They did not frame Roma-
nia’s practices like Russia’s policy of passportization [MD-34]. Yet Moldovans did see Romanian
citizenship as a ‘very strong tool’ of influence even if it would act ‘aggressively’ towards Moldova,
because Romania was able to ‘at least attract[ing] people from Moldova to become closer with
Romania [MD-34, MD-56]. Romanian citizenship allowed Romania to at least ‘claim’ its ‘influence’
and ‘right’ in Moldova even if this was not ‘with arms’ [MD-56]. Indeed, some participants be-
lieved the proliferation of Romanian citizenship went beyond influence, as a process of unification
‘post-factum’, where it would become a fact via the growing Romanian body citizenry in Moldova
[MD-7c]. Moldovans’ discussion of the impacts of Romanian citizenship was wider reaching and
critical, politically and geopolitically, than that of categories with stronger identity attachments to
Romania, i.e. Organic and Cultural Romanians.
Linguistic Moldovans
Linguistic Moldovans identified as culturally and linguistically Moldovan, and distinct from Ro-
manian. They were the only participants who identified their language as di↵erent to Romanian.
They are labelled as Linguistic Moldovans to emphasise this di↵erence, which was the main area
of di↵erence to other categories, in particular to Moldovans. Unlike previous categories, Linguistic
Moldovans were the only category where none had reacquired, or had any interest to reacquire,
Romanian citizenship. They felt neither the same push factors, stemming from problems acquir-
ing visas as previous categories, nor pull the factors, of wanting to work abroad that Linguistic
Moldovans believed ‘forced’ others to apply for Romanian citizenship [MD-41, MD-57b].
Rather, Linguistic Moldovans maligned Romanian citizenship. They saw it as a ‘taboo’ to
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be anything other than a Moldovan citizen [MD-54], and indicative of Romania’s ‘capture’ of the
Moldovan state [MD-41]. While they were open to citizens reacquiring Romanian citizenship,
Linguistic Moldovans saw elite who held Romanian citizenship as having a conflict of interest
because ‘whose state interests do they [o cials] defend? Moldovan or Romanian? I have my
doubts’ [MD-41, MD-57b].
Unlike most participants, who legitimized and normalized Romanian citizenship, Linguistic
Moldovans framed Moldova as an anomaly for allowing public o cials to hold dual citizenship:
‘imagine that the [UK] Queen has a US passport. Is that even possible?’ [MD-41, MD-57b].
Emphasising these conflicts of interest heightened Linguistic Moldovans’ feelings of being ‘under
occupation’ from Romania because they questioned the loyalty of the current Moldovan adminis-
tration because they ‘swore allegiance to Romania’ [MD-41, MD-57b].
Kin-State Citizenship: Legitimate, Strategic vs Identity
Empirically, this article found a wide engagement with Romanian citizenship. All categories, except
Linguistic Moldovans, were interested in reacquiring, and were reacquiring, Romanian citizenship
(Table 1). The prevalence and legitimacy of Romanian citizenship among research participants does
suggest the wider popularity of reacquiring Romanian citizenship among the Moldovan population.
Further, it demonstrates the extent to which identification as Romanian or with Romania was not
a motivating factor for practising Romanian citizenship. The exception was Romania’s strongest
critics—Linguistic Moldovans—who pathologised Romanian citizenship as signifying Romania’s
colonial attitude towards Moldova.
Participants’ explanations for reacquiring Romanian citizenship were more associated with par-
ticipants’ identification. Strategic and legitimate explanations were important across the categories;
what di↵ered was how these were combined with identity motivations (Organic and Cultural Roma-
nians) or not (Ambivalent Romanians, Moldovans). For Organic Romanians, identity explanations
were given greater weight, outpacing, but not wholly replacing, strategic motivations. For Cultural
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Romanians, identity explanations were not necessarily as important as strategic explanations. Still,
as Organic Romanians, Cultural Romanians criticized those who became Romanian citizens without
adequate connection, or commitment, to Romania (i.e. ethnic Russians and Russian speakers).
Participants’ strategic explanations were also more complex than previously discussed by Heintz
(2008) and Suveica (2013) in Moldova vis-a`-vis Romania, and beyond (Harpaz, 2015). These au-
thors emphasize the strategy of seeking dual citizenship from an EU member-state to gain access
to EU rights and benefits, such as to work and travel in the EU. Rather, Romanian citizenship was
sought, strategically, as an alternative source of security. Participants wanted to insure themselves
against domestic risks. Finally, participants wanted the rights—and status, for Organic Romani-
ans—that could be gained from the EU, of becoming equal to Romanian citizens, and to citizens
from the whole EU space.
Research by Skulte-Ouaiss (2013) on Lebanon demonstrates the wider discussion of security
associations of dual citizenship. Resonating with this article’s analysis of Romanian citizenship in
Moldova, Skulte-Ouaiss (2013: 133) explains how in Lebanon dual citizenship was a “safeguard[s]’
to be used when things got rough at home, while allowing them to remain in their homeland
when times are good’. Dual citizenship was therefore a form of security that was both ‘physical,
economic, religious, social and, above all, practical’ (Ibid 138). Dual citizenship o↵er a form of
insurance against anxiety about the future political (and geopolitical) trajectory of the home-state,
whether Lebanon, Turkey or Moldova (Balta and Altan-Olcay, 2015). Dual citizenship in these
cases o↵ered a way of hedging bets by accessing a status that permitted exit should it be needed.
Lastly, the empirical analysis showed the importance of a third legitimate dimension, beyond the
identity-strategic spectrum. Beyond identity and strategy, Romanian citizenship was a legitimate
and normal practice. The normality and legitimacy of Romanian citizenship in Moldova indicates
the extent to which Moldova is becoming a state comprised by a large Romanian post-territorial
citizenry. This process of reacquisition brought participants closer to Romania. It also a↵ected
their identification as European, more than as Romanian, and did not imply a loss of loyalty to
Moldova.
Of participants who were engaging with this practice, Moldovans were most critical, in terms
of its facilitation of depopulation, but also in terms of the state weakness it implied, where public
goods, such as security, jobs and opportunities for development, could now be sought from Romania.
This shift of dependency towards Romania concerns not only mass everyday practices, but also
the everyday practices of the elite, framed as both banal (Cultural Romanians) and malevolent
(Moldovans, Linguistic Moldovans) by participants who saw it as communicating a lack of faith in
Moldova’s future. Here there is a tension between the ideational/symbolic legitimacy that Moldova
can maintain, which does not replace loyalty to the Moldovan state, and the indication of Moldova’s
weak political/geopolitical and social capacity to provide the security and opportunities that its




This article o↵ers a practice-centred perspective to demonstrate the need and value of considering
the meanings and lived experience of kin-state citizenship. Previous dual citizenship literature focus
on the normative, legal and institutional provision of citizenship. This literature primarily considers
citizenship acquisition vis-a`-vis migration, as opposed to kin-state citizenship policies. While both
speak to the increasing phenomenon of dual citizenship, why individuals acquire citizenship from
a kin-state in which they do not reside poses a di↵erent set of questions to why migrants acquire
states from states in which they do reside. The implications are also di↵erent. Proliferation of
dual citizenship via migration might indicate post-national tendencies. However, proliferation of
dual citizenship because of kin-state policies might, rather, indicate a kind of post-territorial ethnic
politics. To date, this literature has focused largely on questions of top-down institutions as opposed
to bottom-up practices.
An emerging literature has sought to rectify this by focusing precisely on the practice of kin-state
citizenship acquisition, arguing that individuals acquire kin-state citizenship because of symbolic or
strategic reasons. Using the case of Romanian citizenship reacquisition in Moldova, first, this article
considered both strategic and identity motivations for engaging with this practice. Second, this
article also considered how these motivational logics might be combined. Finally, this article also
considered a third legitimate dimension. This legitimate dimension goes beyond thick (identity)
and thin (material/strategic) ideas of citizenship to demonstrate the significance of a legitimizing
logic which underpins engagement with Romanian citizenship in Moldova.
While an identity/thick logic was more prevalent among those identifying more with Roma-
nia and as Romanian, a legitimizing logic was found across identification categories. In turn, this
demonstrates the importance of the right to Romanian citizenship, irrespective of identity ties
to Romania and Romanian citizenship. This legitimate underpinning of Romanian citizenship is
matched by the institutional basis of Romanian citizenship which defines the status as one of recov-
ery of a right unfairly denied from the antecedents of those eligible (up to third generation), who can
recover the citizenship status that was withdrawn from the Soviet regime at the end of the Second
World War. The institutional basis underpinning the eligibility of Moldovans to reacquire Roma-
nian citizenship establishes a ‘historical legal relationship’, as opposed to an ethnic relationship,
between contemporary Moldovan citizens and the Romanian state, via former Romanian citizens
as the antecedents of those eligible (Waterbury, 2009: 156). In turn, this establishes a powerful
personal association with such a right. Recovering Romanian citizenship is attached to personal
family experiences and grievances that left participants’ grandparents and great-grandparents’ in
a di↵erent state.
This article argues that understandings of kin-state citizenship need to be informed, first by the
practices of citizenship. Second, focusing on the practices of citizenship illuminates how discourses
of legitimacy can underpin, normalize and explain the prevalence and desire for kin-state citizenship
practices, buttressed by the practical and strategic gains of such a citizenship status. This legitimate
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argument o↵ers a third dimension, beyond a strategic-identity continuum, for understanding kin-
state citizenship practices in other cases where kin-state citizenship is tied to territorial, and familial,
loss (e.g. Hungary, Serbia, Croatia, Bulgaria). In other words, it shows how kin-states can appeal
via citizenship policies to individuals beyond those who identify with the kin-state. It also shows
how kin-state engagement is not just about identifying with the kin-state but about the normality
and legitimacy of engaging with a kin-state and its citizenship policies.
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